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Introduction  
Along with the rise of identity politics, ethnic, and indigenous groups have increasingly organized 
under their own banner, in the process limiting the state’s realm of maneuver. Is this an inevitable 
process, reflecting essential, stable identities? Is the ascendancy of indigenous groups in 
countries such as Bolivia inevitable? If so, why now and not sooner?  
The rise of indigenous groups was not just a matter of elites relaxing control or forming alliances 
with lower classes. This occurred on previous occasions. Further, it was not just a question of 
organization and leadership. Indigenous groups have been organized and led by their own since 
well before the arrival of the Spanish. Sufficient resources had to be available, a certain level of 
organization had to be achieved, and indigenous leaders had to understand the dynamics of their 
environment in order to realize and act upon real and potential political opportunities.  
This article argues that the ascendancy of Bolivia’s indigenous groups during the last decades of 
the twentieth century was the result of the their transformation into networked social movements. 
This transformation provided indigenous groups with the resources and tools necessary to 
increase their ability to organize, coordinate, and communicate (domestically and internationally) 
in such a way that generated leverage which could be used against the state and its international 
supporters. Examining the rise of indigenous groups through political economy and social 
movement methodologies explains this phenomena, and sheds light on the relationship between 
structure and agency. 
Actors, Interests and Frame 
The rise of indigenous power in the last half of the twentieth century is often described as the 
emerging heyday of Bolivia’s indigenous movement. Although it was markedly stronger during 
this period, it is premature and artificial to understand Bolivia’s indigenous organizations as a 
unitary group.[2] As James C. Scott concluded in his work on revolutions, the true nature of 
revolution or opposition parties can be more precisely understood if they are seen as groups—
with some shared interests—that build alliances upon one another to achieve specific goals.[3] 
This understanding reinforces the idea that explaining outcomes using the political economy 
method is not just about resulting policy, but also about what happens to the relationships and 
alliances that were initially formed around specific interests. Closer scrutiny of Bolivia’s ethnic 
movement reveals the existence of numerous groups with different interests, perceptions of 
identity, and approaches to dealing with the state.  
Mining and urban workers immediately formed unions under the broad banner of the Central 
Obrera de Bolivia (COB) following the 1952 revolution, but rural Indians continued to remain 
outside the state fold. An armed rural peasantry, combined with the weakness of the state, 
enabled indigenous groups to continue practicing local governance and communal land use. The 
urban—rural divide was exacerbated by Quechua and Aymara leaders who, because of their 
dissatisfaction with the established political parties and differences with the COB, broke away 
during the 1970s to form their own interest groups. 
In the face of the waning mining industry in the 1980s, the Government of Bolivia reduced the 
scale of the state-directed mining concern, Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, in favor of agriculture. 
Over twenty thousand miners—three quarters of the mining workforce—were let go, and they 
migrated to both urban and rural areas.[4] This immediately reduced the importance of mining 
unions and thrust the rural peasant groups to the forefront of indigenous opposition politics. 
Within the cities, the CSUTCB replaced miners as the dominant group within the COB.  
Infighting among the remaining mining unions also contributed to the shift of power towards the 
peasant groups. At the beginning of this period, miner-based opposition groups framed their 
contention in terms of class conflict. This was a product of previous ties with the Left, and gained 
prominence because of the proximity of mining groups to centers of state power (Sucre and La 
Paz). Bolivia’s rural indigenous population framed its struggle in terms of indigenous identity. No 
longer were assaults on the indigenous population by the state purely economic; rather, they 
became attacks on the very foundation of indigenous culture and heritage. This image was used 
to reinforce arguments against neo-colonialism and economic liberalization. 
Bringing indigenous groups together got off to a slow start. In 1992, ethnic groups from 
throughout Bolivia descended on La Paz to hold the first “National Assembly of Peoples.” The 
purpose of the assembly was to reach a consensus on indigenous goals and agree upon a plan 
to pursue them. However, the assembly failed due to suspicion and distrust of one another 
among the groups.[5] 
Domestic indigenous frames were reinforced by regional ethnicity-based social movements 
throughout the latter half of the 1900s. Ethnicity-framed (but not necessarily generated or led) 
social movements produced violent insurgent groups, such as the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Amaru in Peru and the Tupamaros  in Uruguay. In Ecuador, indigenous groups played a 
significant role in the January 2000 coup d’etat. In Brazil, indigenous groups, with some radical 
offshoots, developed into the Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurias Sem Terra, or Landless 
Workers’ Movement. These ethnicity frames have been amplified by the proliferation of 
international human, indigenous, and labor rights organizations. 
In the midst of this ethnic resurgence, greater emphasis was placed on the cultural importance of 
coca. While it had always been used in traditional religious ceremonies, as well as for reducing 
the physical effects of hunger, high altitude and exhausting work, indigenous groups began to re-
emphasize its sacred significance. Where once coca eradication had jeopardized only the 
livelihoods of those who relied on its cultivation for trade, it now was now framed as an assault on 
a specific people and their historical identity. These frame shifts allowed Bolivia’s indigenous 
groups to present an image with which international audiences could more easily sympathize.  
Despite the success of peasant unions, they failed to capture the support of all of Bolivia’s 
indigenous groups. Just how groups would be represented continued to be divisive; the CSUTCB 
tended to view differences in terms of indigena and blanco, and it assumed that all indigenas 
shared similar interests. Could a majority peasant group adequately represent minority 
indigenous groups that saw differences among ethnicities? And, could it represent groups that 
were not associated with, or interested in, traditional labor unions?[6] How could ethnic peasant 
organizations that recognized the authority of the state represent those who refused to identify 
themselves as citizens?  
The Indians of Bolivia’s eastern lowlands continued to remain removed from the state, as well as 
other domestic indigenous movements. The CSUTCB failed in its attempt to bring the eastern 
Indians into the union because[7] the latter realized that they would always be a minority group 
within the CSUTCB.[8] Eastern Indians were not interested in integration into the state, and 
instead preferred to operate outside the CSUTCB and to limit their goals to local autonomy and 
dignity issues.[9] However, the lessons of strength derived from presenting an organized and 
unified front were not lost on the eastern peoples. They created their own indigenous groups—
Confederacion Indigena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Beni 
(CPDB), and Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani (APG)—to represent their interests and remain 
separate from traditional political parties, or indigenous groups tightly aligned with these political 
parties.  
Several hundred domestic and international NGOs operate in Bolivia.[10] NGOs began to emerge 
in Bolivia by the 1960s, however, they did not begin to gain traction for nearly thirty years. The 
right-leaning state and left-leaning NGOs (which comprised the majority) had generally opposed 
one another for influence in Bolivia. Government corruption tied to left -wing NGOs paved the way 
for neoliberal NGOs (e.g., USAID) to expand in Bolivia as the people and the state reacted 
against the left.[11] The boost that created the nexus of indigenous movements and NGOs came 
in 1994 when the senate approved Law 1551, the Law of Popular Participation (LPP). This law 
created a new relationship for accountability and oversight of local areas—mostly those where 
the state exercised less influence or had weakly penetrated—and it empowered new 
organizaciones territotial de base (Territorial Base Organizations) to deal directly with NGOs. 
Essentially, the state ceded some of its own authority to organize and develop remote 
communities directly to NGOs.[12] 
Funding for some NGOs has been intermittent. Bolivia specifically had been the target of 
European NGOs until the mid-1990s. During the Balkan Wars, Eastern Europe took center stage 
and diverted NGO resources, aid, and foreign investment that had traditionally been earmarked 
for Bolivia.[13] European NGOs and donors often target their support to the poorest nations in the 
world. In this case, Bolivia routinely competed with African nations experiencing the direst of 
conditions, making NGO support sporadic.[14] Finally, even major supporters like the United 
States change their priorities and reallocate funds accordingly (e.g., support for Plan Colombia). 
Like other donors, U.S. aid is also conditional; Bolivia’s eligibility for aid is tied to counter-narcotic 
efforts. Regardless, the continued presence of NGOs in Bolivia has provided indigenous groups 
with alternatives to state development programs that have increased their political maneuver 
space. 
Groupings 
Indigenous groups’ alliances during this period can be described in terms of both internal and 
external groupings. Some continued to join existing political parties, but others began to develop 
their own political organizations to ensure that their interests were properly represented. In turn, 
larger indigenous interest groups began to interact with one another, but they did not coalesce 
into a single, unified movement.  
In western and central Bolivia, instead of joining political parties, these groups also began to 
create their own. They organized themselves around ethnicity, and then developed politically from 
this base.[15] During the 1970s, indigenous groups began to split with the leftist parties with 
which they had previously been associated. Internationally, indigenous leaders like Evo Morales 
began to establish ties with international indigenous rights movements and sympathetic 
governments. This section outlines the mechanisms by which groups attempted to cultivate 
movements by looking at mobilization structures, resources, and repertoires of collective action. 
The focus of effort for indigenous resource mobilization was directed mostly towards improving 
organizational efficiency, coordinating mechanisms, and alliance development among the various 
indigenous groups. In terms of social movement development, existing structural conditions 
favored mobilization. First, assembly was not prohibited by the state, so the population could 
come together in existing communal and public spaces. Indigenous control of the countryside 
contributed to this. Second, the population was already organized along traditional, communal 
and trade union lines, so no new structures necessarily had to be developed. Rather, existing 
structures had only to be modified and directed. Coordination across geographic boundaries was 
facilitated by the proliferation of communication technologies, specifically cell phones and the 
internet, in the 1990s.  
Indigenous self-reliance also supported the development of social movements. Indigenous 
dependence on the state was limited, and was further reduced by indigenous ties to non-state 
actors like NGOs and, to some extent, the underworld via illicit narcotics trafficking.[16] The 
transactions that describe the quality of these relationships vary. Links with the former resemble a 
semi-sustained transnational advocacy relationship, whereas links with the latter resemble 
transnational, temporary political exchange.[17]  
Membership alone is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a social movement. A group 
may be composed of members whose families share a direct indigenous lineage, but without 
collective contentious action (in this case, based on ethnic identity), the group is not a social 
movement. Leites and Wolf explain the difference between preferences and behavior as the 
supply and demand of opposition.[18] A group may identify itself with a certain cause, exhibiting 
preferences for change (demand). However, the group does not become a social movement until 
it begins to organize for the purposes of sustained action, that it to say, to exhibit behavior 
(supply). The supply side takes inputs and converts them into outputs that are aimed at 
expanding the movement and producing change. The conversion mechanism, or social 
movement infrastructure, organizes people and resources, and generates outputs such as 
peaceful or violent demonstrations, services, publicity, etc. Within social movement theory, these 
outputs comprise a group’s repertoire. 
The primary forms of collective action among Bolivia’s indigenous groups have been peaceful but 
disruptive demonstrations and blockades. These often begin with marches that originate in rural 
areas, cover dozens to hundreds of miles, and culminate with the protestors descending on the 
capital. An example of this was the 1990 “March for Land and Dignity.” Over thirty-five days, 
around 700 demonstrators walked from Trinidad to La Paz (over 400 miles through the rainforest 
and the Andes) to demand legal rights to traditional lands. This action gained the support of 
Quechua and Aymara groups, and resulted in a presidential decree that prevented logging on 
certain tribal lands in the Beni Department.[19] 
These marches and demonstrations typically produce two immediate results. First, because the 
marches occur over several days, they are sure to catch the attention of both local and 
international media. Second, because there are only two major routes into La Paz, the marches 
begin to disrupt traffic and commerce long before the protesters actually reach the capital. 
The level of violence exhibited by demonstrators is generally proportional to that exercised by the 
state, and it is generally limited to rock throwing and some vandalism. The level of violence 
associated with an event is also a function of time; demonstrations do not begin with violence, but 
are generally the result of escalating tension towards a tipping point; for example, when police 
forces resort to violence to disperse crowds. However, because demonstrations are often 
scheduled for a specific period, and planned and coordinated among the various groups, 
protestors often disperse without significant violence. 
Deliberate violence was not completely absent from the repertoire. Cocaleros in the Chapare 
conducted violent campaigns when the GOB systemized its forced eradication campaign in the 
late 1990s. During this period, militant cocaleros took up crude arms to ambush machateros  
(eradication forces). They also began to construct improvised explosive devices to mine the 
helicopter landing zones used by eradication units.[20]  
Decision-Making Structures 
Prior to 1994, access of Bolivia’s indigenous population to the national government was mostly 
limited to the alliances it could form with major political parties like the MNR, and indigenous 
interests were, at best, limited to local politics where they were the majority. By 2004, indigenous 
leaders comprised one-third of Bolivia’s congressional representatives and nearly two-thirds of 
Bolivia’s municipal mayorships.[21] In rural areas, groups have created self-rule organizacion 
democratica rotativa (rotating democratic organizations).[22] Unlike Western governing systems’ 
prominence of professional politicians, participation in community assemblies is perceived as a 
local “civic” duty and leadership is shared among heads of household.[23]  
Decision-making structures alone are not significant without political opportunity. While some 
creations of political maneuver space are obvious, whether or not a political opportunity exists is 
often only understood ex post facto. What makes the exploitation of space even less certain is 
that three things must occur. First, an opposition group must correctly interpret the situation. 
Second, it must develop a realistic, feasible plan and marshal the resources to execute it. Third, it 
must properly execute the plan. Even at this point, success is not guaranteed because the 
interaction between opposition and majority is both iterative and mutually influencing. Each shape 
one another’s perception of events and courses of action. 
Actions can be taken to create political opportunities. However, whether or not proactive 
measures are successful rests in large part on multiple variables. Social movement and 
revolutionary theory literature have demonstrated how movements build on one another, and also 
how they take advantage of existing structures and relationships.[24] It takes time to generate 
frames that provide enough resonance to spur action. Furthermore, in the absence of the 
complete exclusion of political parties, opposition movements are less likely to rebel against the 
state. Latin America’s world-famous historical example of one who failed to understand these 
dynamics was Ernesto “Che” Guevara. He assumed that he could jump-start revolution in Bolivia, 
which had its rebellion against colonialism ten years earlier. The oppression frame he attempted 
to inspire his targeted population with failed to resonate. This, combined with his failure to learn 
the proper lessons from the Cuban Revolution, ultimately led to his failure to “resonate.”  
Bolivia’s indigenous population took advantage of three types of political opportunities during this 
period. First, they created their own opportunities through mass mobilization aimed at paralyzing 
transportation within major cities, and along the trans-Bolivia highway. Terrain control was 
significant because it was a scalable repertoire. Groups could shut down a single city, or the 
entire country. As mentioned above, indigenous groups also created political opportunity by 
reducing their dependency on the state. 
Second, they took advantage of the devolution or shifts of power among elites. Even more so 
than in the past, elites seeking control of the state could only take control with the tacit approval 
of Bolivia’s rural indigenous population. This was a function of creating a powerful base that could 
not only oppose other elites, but other lower class factions, as well. 
Third, indigenous groups combined alliance building and bandwagonning to increase their mass 
and generate greater momentum. Similar interests provided the basis for alliances, but often 
groups with dissimilar interests or visions came together; this is what Kevin Healy has termed 
“reciprocal protest-action.”[25] Indigenous groups often had various visions of the state and what 
should be done about it. Groups like the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous 
Movement) sought a violent revolution. Others, like the cocaleros of the MAS party sought 
changes within the government, while some fought for changes to a specific policy. When larger 
opposition groups were planning to strike, which could essentially shut the country down for up to 
a week, other single-issue groups would join the demonstration with the hope of tacking their 
issues onto the major grievances.  
Outcomes 
Revision to Bolivia’s constitution in 1994 declared the Republic to be “multiethnic” and 
“pluricultural.”[26] In accordance with the Law of Popular Participation (or law of decentralization), 
the state formally recognized peasant authority through the legal creation of the territorial base 
organizations and the campesino sindicatos, and it extended the authority of municipalities. 
These grassroots organizations were also given the authority to provide budget oversight for 
municipal government developmental programs.[27]  
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1994 amended the 1953 version of the law. The purpose of the latter 
was to try and incorporate rural indigenous peoples into the state by granting communal lands to 
them as peasants. The new law specifically acknowledged the ownership of communal lands by 
indigenous groups.[28] Thus, land ownership based on class identification now became land 
ownership based on indigenous identity.  
Between 2002 and 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada undertook reforms to further privatize 
Bolivia’s natural gas industry, which ultimately resulted in his resignation. His efforts met with 
rampant protest from indigenous groups along a number of lines. First, groups preferred to 
nationalize the industry; the tax structure aimed at encouraging foreign direct investment that had 
been established as part of the 1985 shock therapy had produced little actual income for Bolivia. 
Second, opposition groups detested the idea of exporting natural gas through Chile. Bolivia’s loss 
of its coastal territory to Chile in 1880 as a result of the War of the Pacific served as a rallying cry 
for nationalism. This is significant because it is one of the few times that indigenous groups 
actually identified themselves as Bolivians. Third, the events served as catalyst for a host of other 
demands that were thrown into the mix. These included demands for social reformation, 
expansion of state services, and even a reversion to a pre-sixteenth century Aymara Kingdom 
(Kallasayu).[29]  
Following Goni’s resignation, Vice President Carlos Mesa was elevated to the presidency and 
made immediate concessions to diffuse the standoff. He agreed to hold a referendum on the 
future of Bolivia’s natural gas industry, take steps towards the creation of a constituent assembly, 
and postpone eradication in the Chapare while it was being surveyed to determine how much 
land could be used for legal coca cultivation.  
Conclusion 
By 2004, Bolivia’s indigenous groups had developed unprecedented power. Although they did not 
occupy the highest government posts, the state could, in fact, do little without at least the tacit 
approval of the indigenous organizations. Bolivia’s indigenous groups achieved this through a 
combination of recognized and self-generated political opportunities, by developing frames that 
legitimated common and dissimilar interests, and by taking advantage of existing social structures 
and spaces to mobilize collective action. These actions helped increase the quality and quantity 
of linkages among the various indigenous groups, as well as expanded their linkages with 
international organizations and third-state actors. These networks were reinforced by the gradual 
infiltration of Bolivia’s peoples into state government. 
The relative autonomy of Bolivia’s indigenous groups signals a clear power shift away from the 
state. Power in Bolivia is now split between the indigenous groups and the Santa Cruz economic 
hub. Despite the increase of indigenous power, Bolivia’s indigenous movements are not unified. 
Differences among them still exist based on local interests (urban or rural) and competing views 
of modernization, representation, local governance, land use and government protection of 
markets. These differences fuel suspicion among the groups and prevent complete unification, 
except in the direst of circumstances. These differences also provide political opportunities for 
other groups, such as Bolivia’s eastern business sector and the military, to take advantage of in 
pursuit of their own particular interests. 
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